## 1NC

### 1NC 1

**The use of violence as a pedagogical tool affirms gendered relations when the 1AC says “The role of the affirmative should be to rethink the way that we engage in war” – they accept war as the trope of political relations – turns the case and increases domestic violence**

Giroux 01[Henry A. Giroux received his Doctorate from Carnegie-Mellon in 1977. He then became professor of education at Boston University from 1977 to 1983. In 1983 he became professor of education and renowned scholar in residence at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio where he also served as Director at the Center for Education and Cultural Studies. He moved to Penn State Univeristy where he took up the Waterbury Chair Professorship at Penn State University from 1992 to May 2004. He also served as the Director of the Waterbury Forum in Education and Cultural Studies. He moved to McMaster University in May 2004, where he currently holds the Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies.] Private Satisfactions and Public Disorders: "Fight Club", Patriarchy, and the Politics of Masculine ViolenceAuthor(s): Henry A. Giroux Source: JAC, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 1-31Published by: JACStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20866386 .Accessed: 09/05/2013 15:14

Unlike a number of Hollywood films in which violence is largely formulaic and superficially visceral, designed primarily to shock, titillate, and celebrate the sensational, Fight Club uses violence as both a form of voyeuristic identification and a pedagogical tool. Although the film offers up a gruesome and relentless spectacle of bare-knuckled brutality, blood curdling, and stylized gore, violence becomes more than ritualistic kitsch, it also provides audiences with an ideologically loaded context and mode of articulation for legitimizing a particular understanding of masculinity and its relationship to important issues regarding moral and civic agency, gender, and politics. Violence in Fight Club is treated as a sport, a crucial component that lets men connect with each other by overcoming fear, pain, and fatigue, while revelling in the illusions of a paramilitary culture. For example, in one vivid scene, Tyler initiates Jack into the higher reaches of homoerotically charged sadism by kissing Jack's hand and then pouring corrosive lye on it, watching as the skin bubbles and curls. Violence in this instance signals its crucial function in both affirming the natural "fierceness" of men and providing them with a concrete experi ence that allows them to connect at some primal level.8 As grotesque as this act appears, Fincher does not engage it – or similar representations in the film – as an expression of pathology.9 On the contrary, such senseless brutality is made crucial to a form of male bonding, glorified for its cathartic and cleansing properties.10 By maximizing the pleasures of bodies, pain, and violence, Fight Club comes dangerously close to giving violence a glamorous and fascist edge (see Theweleit). In many respects, the film mimics fascism's militarization and masculinization of the public sphere with, as Gilroy puts it in another context, its exultation of violence "as a space in which men can know themselves better and love one another legitimately in the absence of the feminine" (Against 146). As a packaged representation of masculine crisis, Fight Club reduces the body to a receptacle for pain parading as pleasure, and in doing so fails to show how the very society it attempts to critique uses an affirmative notion of the body and its pleasures to create consuming subjects. Terry Eagleton captures this sentiment in a discussion of Nazi death camps: Sensation in such conditions becomes a matter of commodified shock value regardless of content: everything can now become pleasure, just as the desensitized morphine addict will grab indiscriminately at any drug. To posit the body and its pleasures as an unquestionably affirmative category is a dangerous illusion, in a social order which reifies and regulates corporeal pleasure for its own ends just as relentlessly as it colonizes the mind. (344) But the violence portrayed in Fight Club is not only reductive in its affirmation of physical aggression as a crucial element of male bonding; it also fails to make problematic those forms of violence that individuals, dissidents, and various marginalized groups experience as sheer acts of oppression deployed by the state and by racist and homophobic individuals as well as by a multitude of other oppressive social forces. What are the limits of romanticizing violence in the face of those repeated instances of abuse and violence that people involuntarily experience every day because of their sexual orientation, the color of their skin, their gender, or their class status?11 There is no sense in the film of the complex connection among the operations of power, agency, and violence, or how some forms of violence function to oppress, infantalize, and demean human life.12 Nor is there any incentive – given the way violence is sutured to primal masculinity – to consider how violence can be resisted, alleviated, and challenged through alternative institutional forms and social practices. This lack of discrimination among diverse forms of violence and the conditions for their emergence, use, and consequences – coupled with a moral indifference to how violence produces human suffering – makes Fight Club a morally bankrupt and politically reactionary film (see also Keane). Representations of violence, masculinity, and gender in the film seem to mirror the pathology of individual and institutional violence that informs the American landscape, extending from all manner of hate crimes to the far Right's celebration of paramilitary and proto-fascist subcultures. Fight Club does not rupture conventional ways of thinking about violence in a world in which casual violence and hip nihilism increasingly pose a threat to human life and democracy itself. Violence in this film functions largely through a politics of denial, insulation, and disinterest. As a consequence, the film is unable to consciously criticize the very violence that it gleefully represents and celebrates. Fight Club portrays a society in which public space collapses and is filled by middle-class white men –disoriented in the pandemonium of conflicting social forces – who end up with a lot of opportunities for violence and with few opportunities (perhaps even none at all) for argument and social engagement (see Bauman; Boggs; Cappella and Jamieson; Chaloupka; Goldfarb; and Jacoby). Macho ebullience in the film is directly linked to the foreclosure of dialogue and critical analysis and moves all too quickly into an absolutist rhetoric that easily lends itself to a geography of violence in which there are no ethical discriminations that matter, no collective forces to engage or stop the numbing brutality and rising tide of aggression. While Jack renounces Tyler's militia-like terrorism at the end of the film, it appears as a meaningless gesture of resistance, as all he can do is stand by and watch as various buildings explode all around him. The message here is entirely consistent with the cynical politics that inform the film: violence is the ultimate language, referent, and state of affairs through which to understand all human events, and there is no way of stopping it. This ideology becomes even more disheartening given the film's attempt to homogenize violence under the mutually determining forces of plea sure and masculine identity formation. It strategically restricts our understanding of the complexity of violence, and, as Susan Sontag suggests in another context, "dissolve[es] politics into pathology" (qtd. in Becker 28). The pathology at issue – and one that is central to Fight Club – is its intensely misogynist representation of women, and its intimation that violence is the only means through which men can be cleansed of the disastrous effect that women have on shaping their identities. From the first scene of the film to the last, women are cast as the binary opposite of masculinity. Women are both the Other and a form of pathology. Jack begins his narrative by claiming that Maria is the cause of all of his problems. Tyler consistently tells Jack that men have lost their manhood because they have been feminized; they are a generation raised by women. And the critical commentary on consumerism presented throughout the film is really not a serious critique of capitalism as much as it is a criticism of the feminization and domestication of men in a society driven by relations of buying and selling. Consumerism is criticized because it is womanish stuff. Moreover, the only primary female character, Maria, appears to exist both to make men unhappy and to service their sexual needs. Maria has no identity outside of the needs of the warrior mentality, the chest-beating impulses of men who revel in patriarchy and enact all of the violence associated with such traditional, hyper-masculine stereo types.13 But representations of masculinity in Fight Club do more than reinscribe forms of male identity within a warrior mentality and in the space of patriarchical relations. They also work to legitimize unequal relations of power and oppression while condoning a view of masculinity predicated on the need to wage violence against all that is feminine both within and outside of their lives.14 Masculinity in this film is directly linked to male violence against women by virtue of the way in which the film ignores and thus sanctions hierarchical, gendered divisions and a masculinist psychic economy. By constructing masculinity on an imaginary terrain in which women are foregrounded as the Other, the flight from the feminine becomes synonymous with sanctioning violence against women as it works simultaneously to eliminate different and opposing definitions of masculinity. Male violence offers men a performative basis on which to construct masculine identity, and it provides the basis for abusing and battering an increasing number of women. According to the National Center for Victims of Crime Web site, an estimated six million women are assaulted by a male partner each year and of these almost two million are severely assaulted (see "Domestic Violence"). Affirming stereotypical notions of male violence while remaining silent about how such violence works to serve male power in subordinating and abusing women creates and legitimizes the pedagogical conditions for such violence to occur. Fight Club provides no understanding of how gendered hierarchies, mediated by a misogynist psychic economy, encourage male violence against women. In short, male violence in this film appears directly linked to fostering those ideological conditions that justify abuse towards women. It links masculinity exclusively to expressions of violence and defines male identity against everything that is feminine.

asking how the executive should be allowed to conduct war masks the fundamental question of whether war should be allowed at all – ensures a military mentality

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and inevitability of war and precluding alternatives. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a particular war is justified or whether particular acts within a given war are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does not get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war as such. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— blind us to the root question. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war in itself, a judgment more fundamental than the more limited assessments of the morality of a given war or the morality of specific acts within a particular war.

this mindset is important – our consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

**The affirmative’s representation of war simply the militarized product of the “war ecomomy” and the shadowy bad actors who perpetuate it actively obscures the structural relations that produce violence**

**Cuomo 96** [Professor at the University of Cincinnati, 1996 [Chris J., “War is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” *Hypatia* v11, n4, Fall, p. database]

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifi­cations for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event-an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typi­cally marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated-by-identifiable, if complex, inten­tions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists-including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and' members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gen­dered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies-cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions In "'Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as *a presence* (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event ­based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and onto­logical dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.' Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the every­day effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant pres­ence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declara­tions of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embed­ded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connec­tions among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, tech­nocratic states.2 Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the impor­tance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of mili­tary institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical dis­cussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

**The alternative must begin in our minds – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence**

Demenchonok 9 – Worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and is currently a Professor of Foreign Languages and Philosophy at Fort Valley State University in Georgia, listed in 2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 21st Century and is a recipient of the Twenty-First Century Award for Achievement in Philosophy from the International Biographical Centre --Edward, Philosophy After Hiroshima: From Power Politics to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-Responsibility, February, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 68, Issue 1, Pages 9-49

Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

**Framing issue – the way we discuss and represent war should come first – the language surrounding violence has direct, concrete effects**

**Collins & Glover 2** (John, Assistant Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence University, Ross, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p. 6-7)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

### 1NC 2

**Resolved requires affirmation of the resolution and negation of the resolution by the negative**

Parcher 1**—**Jeff Parcher, Former Debate Coach at Georgetown University [Feburary 2001, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

**USFG should is governmental action**

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**Statutory restrictions are: Overturn authority, alter the jurisdiction, limit authorization, require inter-agency consultation, or require prior notification**

KAISER 80—the Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress [Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)]

In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory techniques that have the effect of overturning rules, that prevent their enforcement, or that seriously impede or even preempt the promulgation of projected rules. For instance, a statute may alter the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency or extend the exemptions to its authority, thereby affecting existing or anticipated rules. Legislation that affects an agency's funding may be used to prevent enforcement of particular rules or to revoke funding discretion for rulemaking activity or both. Still other actions, less direct but potentially significant, are mandating agency consultation with other federal or state authorities and requiring prior congressional review of proposed rules (separate from the legislative veto sanctions). These last two provisions may change or even halt proposed rules by interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.

It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:

1. legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;

2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement;

3. directives in committee reports, especially those accompanying legislation, authorizations, and appropriations, regarding rules or their implementation;

4. House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action; and

5. direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question.

Such mechanisms are all indirect influences; unlike statutory provisions, they are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding by themselves. Nonetheless, nonstatutory devices are more readily available and more easily effectuated than controls imposed by statute. And some observers have attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other matters.3

It is impossible, in a limited space, to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive listing of congressional actions that override, have the effect of overturning, or prevent the promulgation of administrative rules. Consequently, this report concentrates upon the more direct statutory devices, although it also encompasses committee reports accompanying bills, the one nonstatutory instrument that is frequently most authoritatively connected with the final legislative product. The statutory mechanisms surveyed here cross a wide spectrum of possible congressional action:

1. single-purpose provisions to overturn or preempt a specific rule;

2. alterations in program authority that remove jurisdiction from an agency;

3. agency authorization and appropriation limitations;

4. inter-agency consultation requirements; and

5. congressional prior notification provisions.

**A topical aff must restrict authority that the President has – they don’t.**

Bradley and Goldsmith, 2005 (Curtis and Jack, professor of law at the University of Virginia and professor of law at Harvard, 118 Harvard Law Review 2047, May, lexis)

#### Second, under Justice Jackson's widely accepted categorization of presidential power, n5 "the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation" attach "when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress." n6 This  [\*2051]  proposition applies fully to presidential acts in wartime that are authorized by Congress. n7 By contrast, presidential wartime acts not authorized by Congress lack the same presumption of validity, and the Supreme Court has invalidated a number of these acts precisely because they lacked congressional authorization. n8 The constitutional importance of congressional approval is one reason why so many commentators call for increased congressional involvement in filling in the legal details of the war on terrorism. Before assessing what additional actions Congress should take, however, it is important to assess what Congress has already done. Third, basic principles of constitutional avoidance counsel in favor of focusing on congressional authorization when considering war powers issues. n9 While the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief is enormously important, determining the scope of that authority beyond what Congress has authorized implicates some of the most difficult, unresolved, and contested issues in constitutional law. n10 Courts have been understandably reluctant to address the scope of that constitutional authority, especially during wartime, when the consequences of a constitutional error are potentially enormous. n11 Instead,  [\*2052]  courts have attempted, whenever possible, to decide difficult questions of wartime authority on the basis of what Congress has in fact authorized. n12 This strategy makes particular sense with respect to the novel issues posed by the war on terrorism.

**Prefer our interpretation:**

**Limits – A limited point of stasis is necessary for effective limits which provide equitable ground to both sides – this does not exclude their content but does require them to be topical**

O’Donnell 2004, Timothy M. O’Donnell, Director of Debate, University of Mary Washington, 2004, “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, DOC, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm

Given that advocates on all sides have dug in their heels, it does not take much to imagine that if the current situation continues to persist, the debate “community” will eventually splinter along ideological lines with break out groups forming their own organizations designed to safeguard their own sacrosanct approaches to debate. It has happened before. Yet, while debate has witnessed such crises in the past, the present era of discontent seemingly threatens the very existence of the activity as both a coherent, competitive enterprise and a rewarding, educational co-curricular activity. The origins of the present crisis have many contributing causes, including the advent of mutual preference judging, the postmodern, performative, and activist turns in scholarly circles, the dawn of the information revolution and its attendant technologies, as well as a growing resource disparity between large and small debate programs. There appears to be no mutually agreeable solution. Simply put, there is little consensus about what ought to be the focus of debate, or even what constitutes good debate. Moreover, there appears to be no agreement about what question the judge ought to be answering at the end of the debate. In the present milieu, these questions and many more are literally up for grabs.

The product of this disagreement has been a veritable boon for the negative. We need to look no further than the caselist from the 2004 National Debate Tournament (NDT) to witness the wide variety of strategic tools that the negative now has in its arsenal. In one or more debates at this tournament, the negative team attempted to alter the ground for evaluating the debate by criticizing: the use of problem-solution thinking (or the lack thereof), the will to control present in the affirmative’s opening speech act, the reliance on and use of the state, the illusory belief in fiat, the affirmative’s relationship to the “other,” the embracing or eschewing of policymaking, the ethics of the affirmative, the rhetoric of the affirmative, the representations of the affirmative, the debate community as a whole, the debate community’s practices, the affirmative’s style of debate, the type of evidence the affirmative used (including an over or under reliance on experts), the affirmative’s failure to focus on the body, the revolutionary or anti-revolutionary nature of the affirmative, the piecemeal (or lack there of) nature of change advocated by the affirmative, the desires emanating from the affirmative debaters and/or their opening speech act, the identify formation instantiated by the affirmative, the metaphors inspired by the affirmative, and the very act of voting affirmative. And this is only a partial list.

To make the point another way, it is quite likely that an affirmative team on the 2003-2004 college topic who advocated that the United States should cede political control over reconstruction in Iraq to the United Nations – certainly one of the most pressing issues of the day – could have made it through whole tournaments, indeed large portions of the whole season, without ever discussing the merits of U.S. policy in Iraq after the opening affirmative speech. Such a situation seems problematic at best. That the negative’s strategic arsenal has grown so large that negative teams are tempted to eschew consideration of the important issues of the day (in the case of Iraq, an issue with geopolitical repercussions that will echo for the rest of our lives) for competitive reasons seems more than problematic. In fact, it is downright tragic.

What is so tragic about all of this is that a debater could go through an entire debate career with very little effort to go beyond meta-argument or arguments about argument (i.e. debate theory). The sad fact is that, more often than not, the outcome of any given debate today hinges less on the substantive issues introduced by the affirmative’s first speech, than it does on the resolution of these meta-arguments. These so-called “framework” debates about what the question of the debate ought to be, while somewhat interesting, have little practical application to the circumstances of our times and in my judgment, at least, are less intellectually rewarding than their counterparts. In fact, in a situation where the merits of the public policy issues staked out by the year’s resolution along with the critical issues that those policies raise are no longer the focus of the debate – because the negative can shift the question – why have a resolution at all? The disastrous implications of this trend in academic debate are appearing at the very moment that the academy is being urged to take seriously the goal of educating citizens.

In a world where proponents for any one of the varied questions are equally strident in staking out their views about what the debate ought to be about, agreement seems to be impossible. To be sure, there is value in each of these views. Public policy is important. The political consequences of policies are important. The language used in constructing policies is important. The presentational aspects of policy are important. The epistemological, ontological, and ethical underpinnings of policies are important. And so on. What are we to do then in situations where advocates on all sides make more or less equally compelling claims? As an educator, I am interested in having the students that I work with ask and answer all of these questions at one time or another. As a coach, I am interested in having them have a predictable set of arguments to prepare for. Thus, the question for me is, how can we have a game in which they have such an opportunity? The argument of this essay seeks to chart a partial answer to this question. It involves staking out a compromise position that recognizes that there is value in a wide variety of perspectives and that all deserve an equal opportunity to be represented in competitive debates.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question?

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree.

What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue.

I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.

How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.

**Limited stasis necessary for education and dialogue – absent a prepared in depth focus debate becomes meaningless**

Bassham 07 (Gregory, Professor, Chair of the Philosophy Department, and Director of the Center for Ethics and Public Life – King’s College, et al., Critical Thinking: A Student’s Introduction, p. 3-10)

Critical thinking is what a college education is all about. In many high schools, the emphasis tends to be on “lower-order thinking.” Students are simply expected to passively absorb information and then repeat it back on tests. In col-lege, by contrast, the emphasis is on fostering “higher-order thinking”: the active, intelligent evaluation of ideas and information. This doesn’t mean that factual information and rote learning are ignored in college. But it is not the main goal of a college education to teach students¶ what to think.¶ The main goal is to teach students¶ how to think¶ —that is, how to become independent, self-directed think-ers and learners.¶ W¶ HAT¶ I¶ S¶ C¶ RITICAL¶ T¶ HINKING¶ ?¶ Often when we use the word¶ critical ¶ we mean “negative and fault-ﬁnding. This is the sense we have in mind, for example, when we complain about apparent or a friend who we think is unfairly critical of what we do or say. But¶ critical ¶ also means “involving or exercising skilled judgment or observation.”In this sense critical thinking means thinking clearly and intelligently. More precisely,¶ critical thinking¶ is the general term given to a wide range of cogni-tive skills and intellectual dispositions needed to effectively identify, analyze, and evaluate arguments and truth claims; to discover and overcome personal preconceptions and biases; to formulate and present convincing reasons in sup-port of conclusions; and to make reasonable, intelligent decisions about what to believe and what to do. Put somewhat differently, critical thinking is disciplined thinking governed by clear intellectual standards. Among the most important of these intellectual¶ standards are¶ clarity, precision, accuracy, relevance, consistency, logical cor-rectness, completeness,¶ and¶ fairness.¶ ¶ 1 The function of education is to teach one to think intensively and to think critically.¶ —Martin Luther King Jr.¶ The purpose which runs through all other educational purposes—the common thread of education—is the development of the ability to think.¶ —Educational Policies Commission¶ Let’s begin our introduction to critical thinking by looking brieﬂy at each of these important critical thinking standards.¶ Before we can effectively evaluate a person’s argument or claim, we need to understand clearly what he or she is saying. Unfortunately, that can be difﬁcult because people often fail to express themselves clearly. Sometimes this lack of clarity is due to laziness, carelessness, or a lack of skill. At other times it results from a misguided effort to appear clever, learned, or profound. Consider the following passage from philosopher Martin Heidegger’s inﬂuential but notoriously obscure book¶ Being and Time:¶ ¶ Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. The items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more than temporality itself has been put together “in the course of time” [“mit der Zeit”] out of the future, the having been, and the Present. Temporality “is” not an¶ entity¶ at all. It is not, but it¶ temporalizes¶ itself. . . . Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it tempo-ralizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.¶ 2¶ ¶ That may be profound, or it may be nonsense, or it may be both. Whatever exactly it is, it is quite needlessly obscure. As William Strunk Jr. and E. B. White remark in their classic¶ The Elements of Style,¶ “[M]uddiness is not merely a disturber of prose, it is also a destroyer of life, of hope: death on the highway caused by a badly worded road sign, heartbreak among lovers caused by a misplaced phrase in a well-intentioned letter. . . .”¶ 3¶ Only by paying careful attention to language can we avoid such needless miscommunications and disappointments. Critical thinkers not only strive for clarity of language but also seek max-imum clarity of thought. As self-help books constantly remind us, to achieve our personal goals in life we need a clear conception of our goals and priori-ties, a realistic grasp of our abilities, and a clear understanding of the problems and opportunities we face. Such self-understanding can be achieved only if we value and pursue clarity of thought.¶ Precision¶ Detective stories contain some of the most interesting examples of critical thinking in ﬁction. The most famous ﬁctional sleuth is, of course, Sherlock Holmes, the immortal creation of British writer Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. In Doyle’s stories Holmes is often able to solve complex mysteries when the bungling detectives from Scotland Yard haven’t so much as a clue. What is the secret of his success? An extraordinary commitment to¶ precision.¶ First, by care-ful and highly trained observation, Holmes is able to discover clues that other shave overlooked. Then, by a process of precise logical inference, he is able to reason from those clues to discover the solution to the mystery. Everyone recognizes the importance of precision in specialized ﬁelds such as medicine, mathematics, architecture, and engineering. Critical thinkers also understand the importance of precise thinking in daily life. They under-stand that to cut through the confusions and uncertainties that surround many everyday problems and issues, it is often necessary to insist on precise answers to precise questions: What exactly is the problem we’re facing? What exactly are the alternatives? What exactly are the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative? Only when we habitually seek such precision are we truly critical thinkers.¶ Accuracy¶ There is a well-known saying about computers: “Garbage in, garbage out. ”Simply put, this means that if you put bad information into a computer, bad information is exactly what you will get out of it. Much the same is true of human thinking. No matter how brilliant you may be, you’re almost guaran-teed to make bad decisions if your decisions are based on false information. A good example of this is provided by America’s long and costly involve-ment in Vietnam. The policymakers who embroiled us in that conﬂict were not stupid. On the contrary, they were, in journalist David Halberstam’s oft-quoted phrase, “the best and the brightest” of their generation. Of course, the reasons for their repeated failures of judgment are complex and controversial; but much of the blame, historians agree, must be placed on false and inad-equate information: ignorance of Vietnamese history and culture, an exaggerated estimate of the strategic importance of Vietnam and Southeast Asia, false assumptions about the degree of popular support in South Vietnam, unduly optimistic assessments of the “progress” of the war, and so on. Had American policymakers taken greater pains to learn the truth about such matters, it is likely they would not have made the poor decisions they did. Critical thinkers don’t merely value the truth; they have a¶ passion¶ for accurate, timely information. As consumers, citizens, workers, and parents, they strive to make decisions that are as informed as possible. In the spirit of Socrates’ famous statement that the unexamined life is not worth living, they never stop learning, growing, and inquiring. ¶ Relevance Anyone who has ever sat through a boring school assembly or watched a mud-slinging political debate can appreciate the importance of staying focused on relevant ideas and information. A favorite debaters’ trick is to try to distract an audience’s attention by raising an irrelevant issue. Even Abraham Lincoln wasn’t above such tricks, as the following story told by his law partner illustrates: In a case where Judge [Stephen T.] Logan—always earnest and grave—opposed him, Lincoln created no little merriment by his reference to Logan’s style of dress. He carried the surprise in store for the latter, till he reached his turn before the jury. Addressing them, he said: “Gentlemen, you must be careful and not permit yourselves to be overcome by the eloquence of counsel for the defense. Judge Logan, I know, is an effective lawyer. I have met him too often to doubt that; but shrewd and careful though he be, still he is sometimes wrong. Since this trial has begun I have discovered that, with all his caution and fastidiousness, he hasn’t knowledge enough to put his shirt on right.” Logan turned red as crimson, but sure enough, Lincoln was correct, for the former had donned a new shirt, and by mistake had drawn it over his head with the pleated bosom behind. The general laugh which followed destroyed the effect of Logan’s eloquence over the jury—the very point at which Lincoln aimed. 4 Lincoln’s ploy was entertaining and succeeded in distracting the attention of the jury. Had the jurors been thinking critically, however, they would have realized that carelessness about one’s attire has no logical relevance to the strength of one’s arguments. Consistency It is easy to see why consistency is essential to critical thinking. Logic tells us that if a person holds inconsistent beliefs, at least one of those beliefs must be false. Critical thinkers prize truth and so are constantly on the lookout for inconsistencies, both in their own thinking and in the arguments and assertions of others. There are two kinds of inconsistency that we should avoid. One is logical inconsistency, which involves saying or believing inconsistent things (i.e., things that cannot both or all be true) about a particular matter. The other is practical inconsistency, which involves saying one thing and doing another. Sometimes people are fully aware that their words conﬂict with their deeds. The politician who cynically breaks her campaign promises once she takes ofﬁce, the TV evangelist caught in an extramarital affair, the drug counselor arrested for peddling drugs—such people are hypocrites pure and simple. From a critical thinking point of view, such examples are not especially interesting. As a rule, they involve failures of character to a greater degree than they do failures of critical reasoning. More interesting from a critical thinking standpoint are cases in which people are not fully aware that their words conﬂ ict with their deeds. Such cases highlight an important lesson of critical thinking: that human beings often display a remarkable capacity for self-deception. Author Harold Kushner cites an all-too-typical example: Ask the average person which is more important to him, making money or being devoted to his family, and virtually everyone will answer family without hesitation. But watch how the average person actually lives out his life. See where he really invests his time and energy, and he will give away the fact that he really does not live by what he says he believes. He has let himself be persuaded that if he leaves for work earlier in the morning and comes home more tired at night, he is proving how devoted he is to his family by expending himself to provide them with all the things they have seen advertised. 6 Critical thinking helps us become aware of such unconscious practical inconsistencies, allowing us to deal with them on a conscious and rational basis. It is also common, of course, for people to unknowingly hold inconsistent beliefs about a particular subject. In fact, as Socrates pointed out long ago, such unconscious logical inconsistency is far more common than most people suspect. As we shall see, for example, many today claim that “morality is relative,” while holding a variety of views that imply that it is not relative. Critical thinking helps us recognize such logical inconsistencies or, still better, avoid them altogether. Logical Correctness To think logically is to reason correctly—that is, to draw well-founded conclusions from the beliefs we hold. To think critically we need accurate and well supported beliefs. But, just as important, we need to be able to reason from those beliefs to conclusions that logically follow from them. Unfortunately, illogical thinking is all too common in human affairs. Bertrand Russell, in his classic essay “An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish,” provides an amusing example: I am sometimes shocked by the blasphemies of those who think themselves pious—for instance, the nuns who never take a bath without wearing a bathrobe all the time. When asked why, since no man can see them, they reply: “Oh, but you forget the good God.” Apparently they conceive of the deity as a Peeping Tom, whose omnipotence enables Him to see through bathroom walls, but who is foiled by bathrobes. This view strikes me as curious. 8 As Russell observes, from the proposition 1. God sees everything. the pious nuns correctly drew the conclusion 2. God sees through bathroom walls. However, they failed to draw the equally obvious conclusion that 3. God sees through bathrobes. Such illogic is, indeed, curious—but not, alas, uncommon. Completeness In most contexts, we rightly prefer deep and complete thinking to shallow and superﬁcial thinking. Thus, we justly condemn slipshod criminal investigations, hasty jury deliberations, superﬁcial news stories, sketchy driving directions, and snap medical diagnoses. Of course, there are times when it is impossible or inappropriate to discuss an issue in depth; no one would expect, for example, a thorough and wide-ranging discussion of the ethics of human genetic research in a short newspaper editorial. Generally speaking, however, thinking is better when it is deep rather than shallow, thorough rather than superﬁcial. Fairness Finally, critical thinking demands that our thinking be fair—that is, open minded, impartial, and free of distorting biases and preconceptions. That can be very difﬁ cult to achieve. Even the most superﬁ cial acquaintance with history and the social sciences tells us that people are often strongly disposed to resist unfamiliar ideas, to prejudge issues, to stereotype outsiders, and to identify truth with their own self-interest or the interests of their nation or group. It is probably unrealistic to suppose that our thinking could ever be completely free of biases and preconceptions; to some extent we all perceive reality in ways that are powerfully shaped by our individual life experiences and cultural backgrounds. But as difﬁ cult as it may be to achieve, basic fair-mindedness is clearly an essential attribute of a critical thinker. THE BENEFITS OF CRITICAL THINKING Having looked at some of the key intellectual standards governing critical reasoning (clarity, precision, and so forth), let’s now consider more speciﬁcally what you can expect to gain from a course in critical thinking. Critical Thinking in the Classroom When they ﬁrst enter college, students are sometimes surprised to discover that their professors seem less interested in how they got their beliefs than they are in whether those beliefs can withstand critical scrutiny. In college the focus is on higher-order thinking: the active, intelligent evaluation of ideas and information. For this reason critical thinking plays a vital role throughout the college curriculum. In a critical thinking course, students learn a variety of skills that can greatly improve their classroom performance. These skills include • understanding the arguments and beliefs of others • critically evaluating those arguments and beliefs • developing and defending one’s own well-supported arguments and beliefs Let’s look brieﬂy at each of these three skills. To succeed in college, you must, of course, be able to understand the material you are studying. A course in critical thinking cannot make inherently difﬁcult material easy to grasp, but critical thinking does teach a variety of skills that, with practice, can signiﬁcantly improve your ability to understand the arguments and issues discussed in your college textbooks and classes. In addition, critical thinking can help you critically evaluate what you are learning in class. During your college career, your instructors will often ask you to discuss “critically” some argument or idea introduced in class. Critical thinking teaches a wide range of strategies and skills that can greatly improve your ability to engage in such critical evaluations. You will also be asked to develop your own arguments on particular topics or issues. In an American Government class, for example, you might be asked to write a paper addressing the issue of whether Congress has gone too far in restricting presidential war powers. To write such a paper successfully, you must do more than simply ﬁnd and assess relevant arguments and information. You must also be able to marshal arguments and evidence in a way that convincingly supports your view. The systematic training provided in a course in critical thinking can greatly improve that skill as well. Critical Thinking in the Workplace Surveys indicate that fewer than half of today’s college graduates can expect to be working in their major ﬁ eld of study within ﬁ ve years of graduation. This statistic speaks volumes about changing workplace realities. Increasingly, employers are looking not for employees with highly specialized career skills, since such skills can usually best be learned on the job, but for employees with good thinking and communication skills—quick learners who can solve problems, think creatively, gather and analyze information, draw appropriate conclusions from data, and communicate their ideas clearly and effectively. These are exactly the kinds of generalized thinking and problem-solving skills that a course in critical thinking aims to improve. Critical Thinking in Life Critical thinking is valuable in many contexts outside the classroom and the workplace. Let’s look brieﬂ y at three ways in which this is the case. First, critical thinking can help us avoid making foolish personal decisions. All of us have at one time or another made decisions about consumer purchases, relationships, personal behavior, and the like that we later realized were seriously misguided or irrational. Critical thinking can help us avoid such mistakes by teaching us to think about important life decisions more carefully, clearly, and logically. Second, critical thinking plays a vital role in promoting democratic processes. Despite what cynics might say, in a democracy it really is “we the people” who have the ultimate say over who governs and for what purposes. It is vital, therefore, that citizens’ decisions be as informed and as deliberate as possible. Many of today’s most serious societal problems—environmental destruction, nuclear proliferation, religious and ethnic intolerance, decaying inner cities, failing schools, spiraling health-care costs, to mention just a few—have largely been caused by poor critical thinking. And as Albert Einstein once remarked, “The signiﬁcant problems we face cannot be solved at the level of thinking we were at when we created them.” Third, critical thinking is worth studying for its own sake, simply for the personal enrichment it can bring to our lives. One of the most basic truths of the human condition is that most people, most of the time, believe what they are told. Throughout most of recorded history, people accepted without ques-tion that the earth was the center of the universe, that demons cause disease, that slavery was just, and that women are inferior to men. Critical thinking, honestly and courageously pursued, can help free us from the unexamined assumptions and biases of our upbringing and our society. It lets us step back from the prevailing customs and ideologies of our culture and ask, “This is what I’ve been taught, but is it true?”

**Stasis key to fairness – otherwise debates have no means to engage – fairness is a necessary condition to make debate fun and enjoyable absent ground and effective preparation incentive to research positions diminishes and active engagement is vastly decreased – fair debate is an activity that ought to be encouraged because it creates equal footing to make debate possible**

### 1nc Case

a) Intuition pumping

**Schulzke -- 13** ~Marcus, State University of New York – Albany, February 4 2013, "Simulating Philosophy: Interpreting Video Games as Executable Though Experiments", Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht 2013~

Dennett calls thought experiments “intuition pumps,” as they lead us to make intuitive judgments about their problems, thereby reinforcing our intuitive judgments (1985). The consequence is that “even great intuition pumps can mislead as well as they instruct” (Dennett 1984, 18). Similarly, Harman (1986) argues that moral thought experiments are fundamentally flawed because they bring up difficult moral problems and invite audiences to think about how they would intuitively solve those problems. Harman considers this to be a conservative way of thinking about morality that leads to the application of common sense and directs attention away from alternative perspectives. This critique could be applied to thought experiments in games. Games reflect the biases of their designers and many are relatively conservative in the sense that they generally do not challenge players’ intuitive views of morality or other issues. Most games that evaluate players’ moral decisions tend to do so according to a common sense standard of how people should act (Schulzke 2009). This may reflect the developers’ beliefs, cultural biases, or misguided intuitions that should be carefully scrutinized rather than being tacitly accepted. However, games also question intuitions by continually presenting different and more extreme challenges. Games must appeal to players by introducing new gameplay mechanics, new aesthetic standards, and new game worlds.

b) Design bias

**Schulzke -- 13** ~Marcus, State University of New York – Albany, February 4 2013, "Simulating Philosophy: Interpreting Video Games as Executable Though Experiments", Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht 2013~

They shock players with things like more graphically realistic violence, more challenging moral dilemmas, and more complex decision-making contexts. These innovations can potentially disrupt preconceptions and challenge players to think about familiar topics from different points of view. Video game thought experiments may also raise new problems of bias, as they make players participants in the game world. Personal investment in a character may prevent players from assessing the problems they encounter from a disinterested perspective. The risk of this type of bias is stronger in video games than it is in narrative thought experiments. This type of bias can compromise philosophic detachment. However, this risk should be seen as a factor to weigh when choosing the right tool of analysis rather than as a serious limitation of games. As the previous section showed, narrative thought experiments run into the opposite problem, as they risk of being too detached. The different levels of personal engagement in narrative thought experiments and video games, and the observe risk of biases that arise from these, indicates that these might be most effectively used in conjunction, to explore problems from both a detached and an engaged perspective or that these two types of analysis be employed according to which seems to be most effective at addressing a particular problem

c) Choices

**Schulzke -- 13** ~Marcus, State University of New York – Albany, February 4 2013, "Simulating Philosophy: Interpreting Video Games as Executable Though Experiments", Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht 2013~

. Sicart raises a much different concern, as he questions whether video games are capable of raising meaningful moral problems at all. He argues that moral choice evaluations in video games are severely limited because they usually only allow players to take two or three different courses of action, which are deemed good or evil (Sicart 2009b). The application of these simple binaries can oversimplify the complex moral dilemmas games construct and create the impression that such dilemmas can be easily resolved by simply choosing to be good or evil. If true, this criticism would suggest that the counterfactuals in games are fairly simplistic and philosophically uninteresting. This would, by extension, undermine the prospect of using games to function as thought experiments, as there would be little for philosophers to gain from using games as models of philosophical problems. Sicart’s criticism is apt, but only when applied to certain games. He focuses on games like Fable and Knights of the Old Republic and does not discuss games that have raised more nuanced moral challenges and permitted greater freedom for players to solve these challenges in novel ways. Other games, such as those in the Fallout series, give players an array of choices when they face moral dilemmas and therefore show that games can give players more freedom of action when facing thought experiments than Sicart acknowledges.

## Critique

### 2NC Link

#### 1) Be a good soldier and you win – The gameplay of MGS is a tactical shooter – their thought experiment defines violence as virtious and redemptive – all they change is WHO DOES THE VIOLENCE – the aff misses the violence inherent in the system to CHANGE THE WAY that we do violence—the part of the aff we disagree with is fundamental to the concept of “voting aff

#### We should not use war as a metaphor for describing the process of sustained positive social change. War-talk narrows our understanding of both problems and solutions.

Gabriel **MORAN** Educational Philosophy @ NYU **’11** *Living Nonviolently* p. 102-103

APPLICATIONS OF THE METAPHOR OF WAR War is an insane institution that continues to be discussed as if it were one rational option among others. Joseph Rotblat, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has said that "war must cease to be an admissible human institution."6 One step toward making war inadmissible to human thought is to stop using it as a handy metaphor. Using war language to describe ordinary human problems is not helpful either for the likelihood of war or for the solution of any problem. War is normalized by its metaphorical use; we have "whitewashed the word and brainwashed us, so that we forget its terrible images." 7 Conversely, war as a metaphor to organize our thinking, writes Thomas Peters, "forces people to entertain a very limited set of solutions to solve any problem and a very limited set of images to organize themselves."8 Peters suggests alternate metaphors such as sailing, playfulness, seesaws, or space stations. Most of the time, the metaphor of war is simply unhelpful to solving a problem. At times it is completely inappropriate. An extreme example of the latter case is found in the opening sentence of William James's "The Moral Equivalent of War." James writes: "The war against war is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party." 9 If one is going to oppose war, the worst way to describe the opposition is with the word "war." Perhaps James is aware of that fact and is using ironic humor. However, the contents of the essay do not clearly support that idea. James's positive portrayal of the militarist mind and his call to engage youth in a war against nature give no indication of the inappropriateness of the metaphor of war in describing a moral equivalent of war. William James was not unusual in employing "war" as a way to talk about organized projects or human struggles. When serious effort and determined struggle are involved, it is common to call for a war. One might trace the tendency to ancient philosophies and religious myths that described great cosmic wars. Humans have often imagined their lives to be foot soldiers in the battle between good and evil. Every experience is then viewed as a skirmish in the battle between the Lord's anointed and the forces of Satan. The experiences of inner conflict and of struggle with external forces are a permanent feature of human life. Nevertheless, the casual use of "war" as an organizing image for almost any concerted action in the modern world is both unnecessary and dangerous. In the following pages I examine war as a metaphor in the struggle against nature, drugs, and poverty. One might argue that the most prominent metaphor of war is the war against terrorism . However, I would argue that the use of"war" in a war against terrorism is simply a fraudulent use of the term. The abstraction of terrorism hides the bloody conflict of wars that are very real.

#### War on poverty rhetoric proves that even well-intended conscious choice of war metaphors trap activist performances in an individualized paradigm incapable of dealing with structural violence.

Gabriel **MORAN** Educational Philosophy @ NYU **’11** *Living Nonviolently* p. 107-108

"WAR" ON POVERTY A war on drugs is sometimes associated with another metaphorical war, namely, a "war on poverty." The metaphor of war is even more inappropriate in this case. A war on an abstract noun never makes much sense. In such cases, the need is to find a group who embody the abstraction (terrorists are people who embody terrorism). That seems logical enough; even a war on drugs finds an enemy in drug dealers who cause havoc in society. But who is the enemy in a war on poverty? Can it be said that poor people are the embodiment of poverty? That would make the poor the enemy in this war. No politician or social worker would subscribe to that logic, but the idea of poverty as a crime is never far out of sight in this country.22 Undoubtedly, people who proclaimed a war on poverty did so with good intentions and with sympathy for poor people. The question is whether the metaphor of war helps or hurts their cause. Even more than is the case with drugs, a violent attack on poverty is not a helpful way to think about curing poverty. Why people suffer poverty and how anyone, including the government, can re lieve the plight of the poor, are complex problems that require understanding and long-term commitment. The New Testament says that "the poor you will always have with you" which is intended to stir compassion but can engender complacency. Modern economic systems do guarantee a steady supply of poor people. Govern ments can at least mitigate the harsh results of poverty. Declaring war is a melodramatic call to a battle that cannot issue in unconditional surrender. The best-known call for a war on poverty was made by President Lyndon Johnson. He already had his hands full with a war in Vietnam. One might have thought that the disaster of that war would warn a president from declaring a war on the home front. However, people take their metaphors from what is at hand. Transferring the billions of dollars from a quixotic venture in Southeast Asia to the urgent needs of people at home would have been a great accomplishment. But Johnson never found a way to extricate the country from the real war. Many people assume that Lyndon Johnson or his aides invented the language of a war on poverty. Actually, it goes back at least as far as the beginning of the twentieth century. Writing in 1913, the historian Charles Beard described recent changes in social work: "Charity workers, whose function had hitherto been to gather up the wrecks of civilization and smooth their dying days, began to talk of "a war to the prevention of poverty. "' 23 That earlier war on poverty--or war to the prevention of poverty-got swallowed up by World War I, which Progressives naively thought would lead to greater government services. If the point of metaphorical war is not violence but the mobilization of national resources, the call to war has never brought forth sustained dedication to helping the poor. There are legitimate debates about long-term solutions for poverty, or at least policies for achieving genuine shrinkage of poverty. Some combination of government aid and business opportunities exists in almost every country. The United States has always tilted toward the business side-the so-called private sector. The country has attracted people who are seeking economic rewards. The many people who succeed are resistant to a government war on poverty, but they might be persuaded that some well-thought-out help to the poor would be a good thing for the country as a whole.

#### 2) “How we engage in war” their advocacy statement The role of the affirmative should be to rethink the way that we engage in war. Is phrased in such a way that reveals many hidden assumptions of the aff we think are pretty bad –

#### assumes war is something we engage in NOT something that always exist – instead of interrogating the problems the aff identifies – Unemployment, immiseration, and malnutrition are less newsworthy than armed conflicts, it simply re-thinks the system of war itself

#### 3) up up down down left right left right b a – the konami code. Their politics insulates participants in the neoliberal war mentality the creators of MGS 4 are the same folks who brought you contra the game about killing Nicaraguan communits for raegan

#### Video games are only able to owned by the elite- - what does this mean for the large majority of the population that cant engage there.

#### Perticular demands re-ify the hold of capital

**Zizek 02** Slavoj Zizek, married to a hottie, *Revolution at the Gates, pg* 296-302

So the struggle ahead has no guaranteed outcome – it will confront us with an unprecedented need to act, since it will concern not only a new mode of production, but a radical rupture in what it means to be a human being.'85 Today, we can already discern the signs of a kind of general unease – recall the series of protests usually listed under the name "Seattle". The ten-year honeymoon of triumphant global capitalism is over; the long-overdue "seven-year itch" is here – witness the panicky reactions of the mass media, which, from Time magazine to CNN, started all of a sudden to warn us about the Marxists manipulating the crowd of "honest" protesters. The problem now is the strictly Leninist one: how do we actualize the media's accusations? How do we invent the organizational structure which will confer on this unrest the form of the universal political demand? Otherwise, the momentum will be lost, and all that will remain will be marginal disturbances, perhaps organized like a new Greenpeace, with a certain efficiency, but also strictly limited goals, marketing strategy, and so on. In short, without the form of the Party, the movement remains caught in the vicious cycle of "resistance", one of the big catchwords of "postmodern" politics, which likes to oppose "good" resistance to power to a "bad" revolutionary takeover of power – the last thing we want is the domestication of anti-globalization into just another "site of resistance" against capitalism. As a result, the key "Leninist" lesson today is: politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics, so the answer to those who want just the (quite adequately named) "New Social Movements" is the same as the Jacobins' answer to the Girondin compromisers: "You want revolution without a revolution!" Today's dilemma is that there are two ways open for sociopolitical engagement: either play the game of the system, engage in the "long march through the institutions", or become active in new social movements, from feminism through ecology to anti-racism. And, again, the limit of these movements is that they are not political in the sense of the Universal Singular: they are "single-issue movements" which lack the dimension of universality – that is to say, they do not relate to the social totality. Against Post-politics In "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", Marx deploys something like the logic of hegemony: at the climax of revolutionary enthusiasm, a "universal class" emerges, that is, some particular class imposes itself as universal, and thereby engenders global enthusiasm, since it stands for society as such against the ancien regime, antisocial crime as such (like the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution). What then follows is the disillusion so sarcastically described by Marx: the day after, the gap between the Universal and the Particular becomes visible again; capitalist vulgar profit emerges as the actuality of universal freedom, and so on.'86 For Marx, of course, the only universal class whose singularity (exclusion from the society of property) guarantees its actual universality is the proletariat. This is what Ernesto Laclau rejects in his version of the logic of hegemony: for Laclau, the short circuit between the Universal and the Particular is always illusory, temporary, a kind of "transcendental paralogism".'87 However, is Marx's proletariat really the negative of positive full essential humanity, or "only" the gap of universality as such, irrecoverable in any positivity?188 In Alain Badiou's terms, the proletariat is not another particular class, but a singularity of the social structure and, as such, the universal class, the non-class among the classes. What is crucial here is the properly temporal-dialectical tension between the Universal and the Particular. When Marx says that in Germany, because of the compromised pettiness of the bourgeoisie, it is too late for partial bourgeois emancipation, and that for this reason, in Germany, the condition of every particular emancipation is universal emancipation, one way to read this is to see in it the assertion of the universal "normal" paradigm and its exception: in the "normal" case, partial (false) bourgeois emancipation will be followed by universal emancipation through the proletarian revolution; while in Germany, the "normal" order gets mixed up. There is, however, another, much more radical way to read it: the very German exception, the German bourgeoisie's inability to achieve partial emancipation, opens up the space for a possible universal emancipation. The dimension of universality- thus emerges (only) where the "normal" order that links the succession of particulars is disrupted. For this reason, there is no "normal" revolution; each revolutionary explosion is grounded in an exception, in a short circuit of "too late" and "too early". The French Revolution occurred because France was not able to follow the "normal" English path of capitalist development; the very "normal" English path resulted in the "unnatural" division of labour between the capitalists, who held socioeconomic power, and the aristocracy, which was left with political power. And, according to Marx, this was how Germany produced the ultimate revolution in thought (German Idealism as the philosophical counterpart of the French Revolution): precisely because it lacked a political revolution. The structural necessity of this non-contemporaneity, of this discrepancy, is what gets lost in Habermas: the basic point of his notion of "modernity as an unfinished project" is that the project of modernity contained two facets: the development of "instrumental reason" (scientific-technological manipulation and domination of nature) and the emergence of intersubjective communication free of constraints; hitherto, only the first facet has been fully deployed, and our task is to bring the project of modernity to completion by actualizing the potential of the second facet. What, however, if this discrepancy is structural? What if we cannot simply supplement instrumental Reason with communicational Reason, since the primacy of instrumental Reason is constitutive of modern Reason as such? Habermas is fully consistent in applying the same logic to today's globalization – his thesis is that of "globalization as an unfinished project": The discrepancy between progressive economic integration and the political integration which lags behind can be overcome only through a politics which aims at constructing a higher-level capacity of political acting which would be able to keep pace with deregulated markets.'89 In short, there is no need to fight capitalist globalization directly – we need only to supplement it with an adequate political globalization (a stronger central political body in Strasbourg; the imposition of pan-European social legislation, etc.). However, what if, again, modern capitalism, which generates economic globalization, cannot simply be supplemented by political globalization? What if such an extension of globalization to the political project forced us radically to redefine the contours of economic globalization itself?19') In short, Habermas's basic attitude is nothing less than a disavowal of the twentieth-century – he acts as if the twentieth century, in its specific dimension, did not take place: as if what happened in it were basically just contingent detours, so that the underlying conceptual narrative – that of enlightened democratic liberalism, with its indefinite progress – can be told without them.191 Along the same lines, in order to characterize the demise of the Socialist regimes in 1990, Habermas coined the term "catch-up revolution":192 the West (Western liberal democracy) has nothing to learn from the Eastern European Communist experience, since in 1990, these countries simply caught up with the social development of the Western liberal-democratic regimes. Habermas thereby writes off this experience as simply accidental, denying any fundamental structural relationship between Western democracy and the rise of "totalitarianism" – any notion that "totalitarianism" is a symptom of the inner tensions of the democratic project itself. The same goes for Habermas's treatment of Fascism: against Adorno's and Horkheimer's notion of Fascist "barbarism" as the ineluctable outcome of the "dialectic of Enlightenment", the Fascist regimes are for him a contingent detour (delay, regression) which does not affect the basic logic of modernization and Enlightenment. The task is thus simply to abolish this detour, not to rethink the Enlightenment project itself. This victory over "totalitarianism", however, is a Pyrrhic one: what Habermas needs here is a Hitchcockian lesson (remember Hitchcock's claim that a film is only as interesting as its main evil character). Dismissing the "totalitarian" deadlock as a mere contingent detour leaves us with a comfortable, but ultimately impotent, position of someone who, unperturbed by the catastrophes around him, clings to the basic rationality of the universe. The promise of the "Seattle" movement lies in the fact that it is the very opposite of its usual media designation (the "anti-globalization protest"): it is the first kernel of a new global movement, global with regard to its content (it aims at a global confrontation with today's capitalism) as well as its form (it is a global movement, a mobile international network ready to intervene anywhere from Seattle to Prague). It is more global than "global capitalism", since it brings into the game its victims – that is, those who are excluded from capitalist globalization, as well as those who are included in a way which reduces them to proletarian misery.'93 Perhaps I should take the risk here of applying Hegel's old distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" universality: capitalist globalization is "abstract", focused on the speculative movement of Capital; whereas the "Seattle" movement stands for "concrete universality", both for the totality of global capitalism and for its excluded dark side. The reality of capitalist globalization is best exemplified by the victory in June 2001 of the Russian nuclear lobby, which forced the parliament's decision that Russia would import nuclear waste from developed Western countries. Here, Lenin's reproach to liberals is crucial: they merely exploit the working classes' discontent to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the conservatives, instead of identifying with it to the end.'" Is this not also true of today's Left liberals? They like to evoke racism, ecology, workers' grievances, and so on, to score points over the conservatives – without endangering the system. Remember how, in Seattle, Bill Clinton himself deftly referred to the protesters on the streets outside, reminding the assembled leaders inside the guarded palaces that they should listen to the demonstrators' message (the message which, of course, Clinton interpreted, depriving it of its subversive sting, which he attributed to the dangerous extremists introducing chaos and violence into the majority of peaceful protesters). This Clintonesque stance later developed into an elaborate "carrot-and stick" strategy of containment: on the one hand, paranoia (the notion that there is a dark Marxist plot lurking behind it); on the other hand, in Genoa, none other than Berlusconi provided food and shelter for the anti-globalization demonstrators – on condition that they "behaved properly", and did not disturb the official event. It is the same with all New Social Movements, up to the Zapatistas in Chiapas: establishment is always ready to "listen to their demands", depriving them of their proper political sting. The system is by definition ecumenical, open, tolerant, ready to "listen" to all – even if you insist on your demands, they are deprived of their universal political sting by the very form of negotiation. The true Third Way we have to look for is this third way between institutionalized parliamentary politics and the New Social Movements. As a sign of this emerging uneasiness and need for a true Third Way, it is interesting to see how, in a recent interview, even a conservative liberal like John le Carre had to admit that, as a consequence of the "love affair between Thatcher and Reagan" in most of the developed Western countries, and especially in the United Kingdom, "the social infrastructure has practically stopped working"; this then leads him to make a direct plea for, at least, "re-nationalizing the railways and water.”95 We are in fact approaching a state in which (selective) private affluence is accompanied by a global (ecological, infrastructural) degradation which will soon start to affect us all: the quality of water is not a problem confined to the UK – a recent survey showed that the entire reservoir from which the Los Angeles area gets its water is already so polluted by man-made toxic chemicals that it will soon be impossible to make it drinkable even through the use of the most advanced filters. Le Carre expressed his fury at Blair for accepting the basic Thatcherite co-ordinates in very precise terms: "I thought last time, in 1997, that he was lying when he denied he was a socialist. The worst thing I can say about him is that he was telling the truth." "More precisely, even if, in 1997, Blair was "subjectively" lying, even if his secret agenda was to save whatever can be salvaged of the socialist agenda he was "objectively" telling the truth: his (eventual) subjective socialist conviction was a self-deception, an illusion which enabled him to fulfill his "objective" role, that of completing the Thatcherite "revolution". How, then, are we to respond to the eternal dilemma of the radical Left: should we strategically support centre-Left figures like Bill Clinton against the conservatives, or should we adopt the stance of "It doesn't matter, we shouldn't get involved in these fights – in a way, it's even better if the Right is directly in power, since, in this way, it will be easier for the people to see the truth of the situation"? The answer is a variation on Stalin's answer to the question: "Which deviation is worse, the Rightist or the Leftist one?": they are both worse. What we should do is adopt the stance of the proper dialectical paradox: in principle, of course, one should be indifferent to the struggle between the liberal and conservative poles of today's official politics – however, one can only afford to be indifferent if the liberal option is in power. Otherwise, the price may appear much too high – consider the catastrophic consequences of the German Communist Party's decision in the early 1930s not to focus on the struggle against the Nazis, with the justification that the Nazi dictatorship was the last desperate stage of capitalist domination, which would open the eyes of the working class, shattering their belief in "bourgeois" democratic institutions. Along these lines, even Claude Lefort, whom no one can accuse of Communist sympathies, recently made a crucial point in his answer to Francois Furet: today's liberal consensus is the result of a hundred and fifty years of Leftist workers' struggle and pressure upon the State; it incorporated demands which were dismissed by liberals with horror a hundred years ago – even less.'97 If we need proof, we should simply look at the list of the demands at the end of the Communist Manifesto: apart from two or three of them (which, of course, are the crucial ones), all the others are today part of the consensus (at least the disintegrating Welfare State consensus): universal franchise; free education; universal healthcare and care for the elderly; a limitation on child labour.... In short, today's "bourgeois democracy" is the result not of liberalism's intrinsic development, but of the proletarian class struggle. It is true that, today, it is the radical populist Right which usually breaks the (still) prevailing liberal-democratic consensus, gradually making acceptable hitherto excluded ideas (the partial justification of Fascism, the need to constrain abstract citizenship on grounds of ethnic identity, etc.). However, the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals: "We shouldn't play with fire: against the new Rightist onslaught, we should insist more than ever on the democratic consensus – any criticism of it, wittingly or unwittingly, helps the New Right!" This is the key line of separation: we should reject this blackmail, taking the risk of disturbing the liberal consensus, even up to questioning the very notion of democracy. The ultimate answer to the criticism that radical Left proposals are utopian should thus be that, today, the true utopia is the belief that the present liberal-democratic capitalist consensus can go on indefinitely, with- out radical change. We are therefore back with the old '68 slogan "Soyons realistes, demandons l'impossible!": in order to be a true "realist", we must consider breaking out of the constraints of what appears "possible" (or, as we usually put it, "feasible").

#### 4) False choice – Warism – asking how the executive should be allowed to conduct war masks the fundamental question of whether war should be allowed at all – ensures a military mentality – cady evidence –

#### 5) Gendered Higherarchies – the violence first, rethink our war and the war metaphor are inherently gendered concepts Using violence as the solution reproduces gender relations – their representations spill over

#### Quest for negative peace trades off with positive peace – can’t combine the aff and the alt

Pankhurst 3

(Donna-, May 1, Development in Practice, “The 'sex war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building”, Vol. 13 # 2&3, Infomaworld; Jacob)

Turning to the meanings of the term ‘peace’, Galtung’s (1985) conception of negative peace has come into widespread use, and is probably the most common meaning given to the word, i.e. the end or absence of widespread violent conflict associated with war. A ‘peaceful’ society in this sense may therefore include a society in which social violence (against women, for instance) and/or structural violence (in situations of extreme inequality, for example) are prevalent. Moreover, this limited ‘peace goal’, of an absence of specific forms of violence associated with war, can and often does lead to a strategy in which all other goals become secondary. The absence of analysis of the deeper (social) causes of violence also paves the way for peace agreements that leave major causes of violent conflict completely unresolved. Negative peace may therefore be achieved by accepting a worse state of affairs than that which motivated the outburst of violence in the first place, for the sake of (perhaps short-term) ending organised violence. Galtung’s alternative vision, that of positive peace, requires not only that all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. In other words, major conflicts of interest, as well as their violent manifestation, need to be resolved. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include: an active and egalitarian civil society; inclusive democratic political structures and processes; and open and accountable government. Working towards these objectives opens up the field of peace building far more widely, to include the promotion and encouragement of new forms of citizenship and political participation to develop active democracies. It also opens up the fundamental question of how an economy is to be managed, with what kind of state intervention, and in whose interests. But more often than not discussion of these important issues tends to be closed off, for the sake of ‘ending the violence’, leaving major causes of violence and war unresolved—including not only economic inequalities, but also major social divisions and the social celebration of violent masculinities.

### 2NC Alt

#### **Militaristic war may be a central value of modern Western culture, but it can be changed through analysis – multiple empirical examples prove**

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 23-24)

The slow but persistent rise in awareness of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual- orientation, and class oppression in our time and the beginning efforts of liberation from within oppressed groups offer hope that even the most deeply held and least explicitly challenged predispositions of culture might be examined. Such examinations can lead to changes in the lives of the oppressed. Perhaps even those oppressed by warism will one day free themselves from accepting war as an inevitable condition of nature. Two hundred years ago slavery was a common and well- established social institution in the United States. It had been an ordinary feature of many societies dating to ancient and perhaps prehistoric times. Slavery was taken for granted as a natural condition for beings thought to be inferior to members of the dominant group. And slavery was considered an essential feature of our nation’s economy. Within the past two centuries, attitudes toward slavery have changed dramatically. With these fundamental shifts in normative lenses came fundamental shifts in the practice and legality of slavery. These changes have been as difficult as they have been dramatic, for former slaves, for former slave- holders, and for culture at large. While deep racial prejudices persist to this day, slavery is no longer tolerated in modern societies. Slavery- like conditions of severe economic exploitation of labor have become embarrassments to dominant groups in part because slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures— thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the natural conditions of creation—can change in fundamental ways in relatively short periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point to the consideration of warism: “War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the ancients thought to be immutable fact.”9 The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose rather than innate and determined features of human nature. It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is “natural” for males and “natural” for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to choose and create the selves we are to be; we need not be defined by hidden presumptions of gender roles. Parallel to racial and gender liberation movements, pacifism questions taking warism for granted. Pacifists seek an examination of our unquestioned assumption of warism to expose it as racism and sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex- ism consider the oppression of nonwhites and women, respectively, to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society, so opponents of warism— pacifists of various sorts— consider war to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society.

## T

### 1NC Expertism / Positivism Good

#### 1. Positivism is inevitable – without it we cant construct any theory – the possibility of some flawed theory construction is better than epistemological anarchy

Brown 11 [Vernon, Cadiff University, 2/27/11, “The Reflectivist Critique of Positivist IR Theory,” <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7328> ]

There is a great deal of support for the positivist approach in IR despite the critiques presented above. As the survey by Maliniak et al. showed, seventy percent of American IR scholars still consider themselves as positivists with a number of the rest not yet reflectivist. This is significant as the United States is still considered to be the major force in IR scholarship. There are many reasons for this continued success of positivism in IR, the majority of which have to do with either the continued reliance on empirical methods or the failure of many reflectivists, especially the post-modernists, to offer any suggestions to fill the epistemological void left by their passing. David Houghton (2008, p.118) addresses both of these by writing that despite their critique, reflectivists continue to use empirical, observational methods and that it is not possible to be anything but positivist because, as he writes, ‘truth claims about the world have to come from somewhere’. He also suggests that reflectivists are essentially engaging in what can only be perceived as a negative exercise since by continually deconstructing theories one will eventually be left with nothing that is considered a legitimate theory. Another issue raised in response to the reflectivist critique focuses on the pluralism which scholars have called for in the face of epistemological relativism. Lapid (1989, p.249) warns that such pluralism, ‘If adopted uncritically or taken to its logical conclusion, [can] deteriorate into a condition of epistemological anarchy under which almost any position can legitimately claim equal hearing’, and that in such a state it would become nearly impossible to distinguish theoretical proliferation from theoretical growth. Positivism defends itself by claiming that scholarship is inherently observational, therefore empirical,

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and that if reflectivism is followed to its logical endpoint there would be no legitimate theories left because they would have been either deconstructed or created without a means of testing their legitimacy. Conclusion: The critique of positivism by the reflectivists is fundamentally an epistemological one. Each side can and does make compelling arguments showing the strength of their position. While it is important to acknowledge the positivists’ attempts to ground the discipline in a naturalist, scientific area there is still the obvious fact that the assumptions on which their epistemology is based are too easily deconstructed when they attempt to explain phenomena and make predictions in the socially constructed world which IR purports to study. As Milja Kurki (2009, p.442) suggests, positivism fails to acknowledge the possibility that all theories are at some level ‘politically and socially contextualized’. This creates the possibility for positivist theories to create predictions that are fundamentally flawed as they have failed to take into account the context within which their facts are constructed. This in turn allows the reflectivist theorists to deconstruct the predictions due to misunderstandings that arise from the lack of context in the positivists’ predictions. The question of what positivism has to say in a socially constructed and interpreted world is still an important one, however, since the study of IR is still in many ways observational and therefore empirical. There is also the valid claim that in the face of the possible anarchical pluralism or lack of legitimate theories left by reflectivist critiques there needs to be some sense of scientific and theoretical grounding, and that positivism provides that very thing. In the end, reflectivism performs a valuable service in widening the range of legitimate research that is possible by IR scholars and allowing such research to take into account the understanding that the issues studied are birthed by social conventions. There still must be, however, some framework within this study to prevent the anarchy that could follow in the wake of reflectivism and while positivism is in no ways perfect, or even close to it, it still provides such a framework that if made to be self-reflective and continually evolving, could provide the stability needed.

### AT: Good for decisionmaking

Literally impossible to be negative -- your author says there is no literature

**Schulzke -- their author -- 13** ~Marcus, State University of New York – Albany, February 4 2013, "Simulating Philosophy: Interpreting Video Games as Executable Though Experiments", Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht 2013~

Because treating events in video games as functioning like thought experiments is a novel suggestion, there is no established literature addressing the strengths and weaknesses of this perspective on games. Nevertheless, the literatures on thought experiments and on the philosophical themes in video games offer several important arguments that could be made against interpreting video games as functional thought experiments. The critiques of moral thought experiments and moral choice in games are especially strong and the point at which the literature on thought experiments and video games overlap the most, so I will focus on responding to these.

**Justify all "thought experiments"**

**Schulzke -- their author -- 13** ~Marcus, State University of New York – Albany, February 4 2013, "Simulating Philosophy: Interpreting Video Games as Executable Though Experiments", Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht 2013~

There is widespread disagreement over exactly what counts as a thought experiment, so it is impossible to compare games against a definitive definition. However, it is possible to identify which of the characteristics that may be included in a definition video games satisfy and which they do not. For example, Rescher interprets the concept of a thought experiment broadly, to include almost any use of counterfactual reasoning to raise theoretical or empirical questions (Rescher 1991). This sets the standard for qualifying as a thought experiment relatively low and certainly includes video games since these present counterfactuals. Others have explained thought experiments as a type of mental modeling that allows experimenters to work with mental rather than physical manipulations to produce the experiment